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Temkin (1986,1993) sets out a philosophical basis for the analysis of 
income inequality that provides an important alternative to the 
mainstream welfarist approach.  We show that the Temkin principles 
can be characterised by a parsimonious axiomatic structure and we use 
this structure to derive a new class of inequality indices and an 
inequality ordering.  This class of indices has a family relationship to 
well-known measures of inequality, deprivation and poverty.  The 
ordering is shown to have properties analogous to second-order 
dominance results. 
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1 Introduction
The mainstream literature on income inequality has used insights from re-
lated literatures  such as social welfare, information theory, risk analysis 
in order to motivate the analysis and to construct inequality measures.1 In
some respects one can see inequality measurement approached in this way as
a by-product of fundamental analysis developed for other purposes. By con-
trast the philosopher Larry Temkin has provided a basis for thinking about
income inequality directly. His contributions (Temkin 1986, 1993) suggest
that we may think of inequality simply as an aggregate of individual com-
plaints experienced by individuals located in disadvantaged positions in the
income distribution.
In this paper we move beyond the broad-brush suggestions of Temkin
about the nature of these complaints and the way in which they may be
aggregated in order to provide a rigorous analysis of a type of inequality
index and inequality ordering that his approach entails. This is done by
building a simple formal model of the income distribution and introducing
a number of axioms that, although familiar from the inequality literature,
encompass the distinctive Temkin approach. Sections 2 and 3 provide an
overview of the issues and a description of our own methodology. Sections
4 and 5 establish the principal results on inequality and their implications.
Section 6 introduces the associated ordering principle and demonstrates its
relationship to the inequality indices. Section 7 examines some theoretical
and practical extensions to the basic analysis.
2 Background
Constructing an approach to income inequality upon the notion of complaints
about income distribution suggests that there may be connections with a
number of existing intellectual strands in the income-distribution literature,
including inequality, poverty and deprivation. This is the case and these
will be discussed in sections 2.2 to 2.4 and elsewhere. But Þrst we set out a
summary of the novel contributions from Temkin himself.
1See Cowell (2000) for an overview.
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2.1 Temkin: the essentials
To oversimplify, the Temkin approach can be broken down into two compo-
nents, as follows.2
Individual complaints. The fundamental concept required for the Temkin
approach is that of an individuals complaint about income distribution. Typ-
ically this involves a persons welfare and that of a reference person or group
(Temkin 1986, p. 104) although one could obviously express the complaint
in terms of the persons income in comparison to that of others. It is an in-
dividualistic approach to the assessment of income distribution but one that
is based on a primitive concept of diﬀerences rather than levels of utility or
income. This is in clear contrast to the tradition of welfarism  see section
2.3 below.
The idea of a complaint raises two related questions: Who has a com-
plaint? What is the reference group or point of reference? Temkin considers
a number of possibilities but focuses attention principally on the following:
 Reference to the best-oﬀ person (BOP). Everyone but the person with
the highest income has a legitimate complaint and everyone has the
same reference point.
 Reference to all those who are better oﬀ (ATBO). Everyone but the
best oﬀ has a legitimate complaint but persons at diﬀerent positions in
the income distribution make reference to diﬀerent groups.
 Reference to average income (AVE).
Temkin discusses some speciÞc well-known inequality measures in rela-
tion to each concept of complaint. However, two key problems remain open:
whether the complaint approach induces a distinct coherent structure of in-
equality measurement and whether there may be other new inequality indices
speciÞc to the Temkin approach. Here we deal with these issues principally
in the context of BOP. We will show that the approach developed for BOP
can be extended to ATBO and possibly other concepts of reference group.
2For further discussion of the Temkin approach see Devooght (2001).
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Aggregation. The second component is the aggregation of complaints over
the population. Again, more than one method of aggregation is discussed
by Temkin: essentially inequality is to be regarded as either the simple or
weighted sum of these complaints. Where a weighted approach is used, the
weights increase with the size of the complaint (Temkin 1986, p.113).
The aggregation has normative signiÞcance because Temkin wants to in-
terpret the overall complaint in the community as some kind of social bad.
However the issue remains open as to whether a precise system of aggregation
is implied by a speciÞc set of ethical principles; this issue is also addressed
in our axiomatic treatment.
2.2 Complaint, Deprivation, Envy
The Temkin approach Þnds some echoes in the literature on the mainstream
literature on the assessment of income distribution. For example the idea of
complaint may suggest that this is the concept of envy under utilitarianism.
However the two concepts are distinct in nature because the complaint is
considered to exist independently of the way a disadvantaged person may
feel about it.
To say that the best-oﬀ have nothing to complain about is in
no way to impugn their moral sensibilities. They may be just as
concerned about the inequality in their world as anyone else. Nor
is it to deny that, insofar as one is concerned about inequality, one
might have a complaint about them being as well of as they are.
It is only to recognize that, since they are at least as well oﬀ as
every other member of their world, they have nothing to complain
about. Similarly, to say that the worst-oﬀ have a complaint is not
to claim that they will in fact complain (they may not). It is only
to recognize that it is a bad thing (unjust or unfair) for them to
be worse oﬀ than the other members of their world through no
fault of their own  (Temkin 1986, p.102).
Secondly the description of a complaint suggests that there may be a logi-
cal relation to relative deprivation (Runciman 1966). The ATBO approach to
complaint is indeed closely related but we disagree with Chakravarty (1998)s
remark that the interpretation of relative deprivation in terms of income
diﬀerences is formally equivalent to the Temkin (1986) approach to inequal-
ity measurement. First, Temkins approach goes beyond the conventional
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concept of individual relative deprivation to encompass other concepts of
complaint, notably BOP. Second, we will see that arising from Temkins ap-
proach there is a large class of inequality measures that has not been explored
by the deprivation literature.
2.3 Welfare
The main body of literature on the assessment of income distribution in terms
of inequality is typically based on a welfarist and individualistic approach to
distributional issues  see for example the seminal paper of Atkinson (1970).
However the framework of inequality analysis that emerges from this is typi-
cally unsuitable for interpretation within the language of complaints (Temkin
1993, pages 135-141). Nevertheless a welfare interpretation of the complaints
approach is important: Temkin is explicit that he is concerned which distribu-
tion is better rather than which exhibits greater or less inequality. It seems
appropriate to examine the welfare implications of the complaints approach
and, where possible try to reconcile it with the conventional welfare-economic
approach to income distribution.
2.4 The transfer principle
The Þnal strand that is relevant to our discussion concerns the principle that
has been at the heart of mainstream inequality analysis for several decades.
The transfer principle has its origin in the work of Pigou (1912). However,
Pigou conÞned his discussion to a two-person case where the distributional
implications are straightforward. Dalton (1920) generalised the approach in
a manner that has become the foundation for most of the modern work on
distributional analysis: any transfer from a person to someone who is richer
must increase inequality. However it has been argued that the Dalton exten-
sion of the Pigou approach is overly strong. Experimental evidence suggests
that peoples views on distributional rankings may violate the Dalton prin-
ciple although being consistent with the elementary Pigou approach (Amiel
and Cowell 1998, 1999). In what follows we provide a step towards addressing
this problem by introducing more than one type of transfer principle.
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3 The approach
We assume that the problem is one of evaluating and comparing income
distributions in a Þnite Þxed-sized population with more than three members
and that income can take any real value. Throughout the following we will
work with vectors of ordered incomes.
3.1 Notation
Let Ω∗n be the set of ordered n-vectors:
Ω∗n := {x : x ∈ Rn, x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn} (1)
and deÞne:
Ωn := {x : x ∈ Ω∗n, xn−1 < xn} . (2)
An income distribution is given by
x := (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ D
where D ⊆ Ω∗n and n > 3. DeÞne r = r(x) where
r(x) := min{i : xi = xn} (3)
This device allows us to handle in a natural way the case where there are
multiple persons at the very top of the distribution. Write 1 for the n-
vector (1, 1, ..., 1) and x−i(α) for the vector x modiÞed by replacing the ith
component by α:
x−i(α) := (x1, ..., xi−1,α, xi+1, ..., xn)
such that xi−1 ≤ α ≤ xi+1. We will also use xij(δ) to denote the vector
x modiÞed by increasing the ith component by δ and decreasing the jth
component by δ.
DeÞnition 1 An inequality measure is a function T :D→ R+.
DeÞnition 2 For any x ∈ D and any positive i < r, where r > 1 is given by
(3) a transfer from the richest is a transformation x 7→ xir(δ) where δ > 0
is such that xi + δ ≤ xi+1 and xr−1 ≤ xr − δ.
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DeÞnition 3 For any x ∈ D and any pair (i, j) satisfying 0 < i < j < r a
progressive transfer is a transformation x 7→ xij(δ) where xi + δ ≤ xi+1 and
xj − δ ≥ xj−1.
Note the explicit distinction between deÞnitions 2 and 3  transfers from
the richest (where the cause of the complaint arises) to the rest of the
community and richer-to-poorer transfers within the group of complainants.
3.2 Axioms
The following six axioms are based on those that are standard in the liter-
ature on inequality and related issues;3 they are used to endow the class of
complaint-regarding inequality measures with an appropriate structure:
Axiom 1 Continuity. T is continuous.
Axiom 2 Monotonicity. For x ∈ D and i < r(x) T is strictly decreasing in
xi.
Axiom 3 Independence. Let x, y ∈ D be such that T (x) = T (y), r(x) =
r(y) = r > 2 and xr = yr. Then, for any i < r, xi = yi ⇒
∀α ∈ [xi−1, xi+1]∩[yi−1, yi+1] and x−i(α),y−i(α) ∈ D : T (x−i(α)) = T (y−i(α)) .
Axiom 4 Linear homogeneity. ∀λ > 0 :
T (λx) = λT (x). (4)
Axiom 5 Translation invariance. ∀α ∈ R :
T (x) = T (x+α1), (5)
where 1 := (1, 1, ..., 1).
3For example, in motivating an analysis of the standard FGT (Foster et al. 1984)
poverty measures Ebert and Moyes (2002) use continuity, monotonicity, linear homogeneity
and translation invariance; likewise, in an axiomatisation of individual deprivation, Ebert
and Moyes (2000) use these axioms and independence. The concept of independence in
Ebert and Moyes (2002) is somewhat diﬀerent since they do not use the concept of income
rank.
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Axiom 6 Normalisation. T (0, ..., 0, 1) = 1
Axiom 2 formalises the idea that  for everyone other than the richest
 an individuals complaint is reduced if his income is increased. Axiom 3
implies the following about two worlds with identical inequality and in which
person with income-rank i has the same complaint: varying that persons
income by a small amount will have an identical impact on inequality in
the two worlds. Clearly Axioms 4 and 5 imply that if all incomes double
then so does the aggregate complaint, but adding a dollar simultaneously
to everyones resources (whether perpetrator or victim) leaves complaints
untouched.4 Axioms 1 and 6 are technical requirements to ensure that the
resulting inequality measure is well-deÞned.
The Þnal two axioms focus on the two main ethical issues concerning
complaint-regarding inequality measures.
Axiom 7 Transfers from the richest. T satisÞes the principle of transfers
from the richest if
T (xir(δ)) < T (x) (6)
where xir(δ) ∈ D and i, r, δ satisfy the conditions in DeÞnition 2.
Axiom 8 Progressive transfers. T satisÞes the principle of progressive trans-
fers if
T (xij(δ)) < T (x) (7)
where xij(δ) ∈ D and i, j, r, δ satisfy the conditions in DeÞnition 3.
4 Inequality: main results
The analysis of inequality and complaints interpreted as BOP requires careful
consideration of the set of income distributions. In section 4.1 we concentrate
Þrst on the special case where there is literally a single Best-oﬀ Person 
D = Ωn in (2). This is of course rather limiting; so in section 4.2 we examine
the way in which some of the results can be extended to the case where there
may be many persons with the topmost income.
4See, for example, Temkin (1986), p. 106, (1993) p. 26. However, Temkin (1993),
chapter 6 appears to contradict this and this point is discussed in section 7.1 below.
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4.1 Pure BOP
Here one has r(x) = n. We proceed by Þrst characterising the general struc-
ture of complaint-based inequality measures according to the principles set
out in section 3.2 and then examining the general structure in the light of
the two concepts of the transfer principle.
Proposition 1 Assume that D = Ωn; then T satisÞes Axioms 1 to 6 if and
only if there are wk > 0, k = 1, ..., n− 1,
Pn−1
k=1 wk = 1 and ε ∈ R such that
Tε(x) =
"
n−1X
k=1
wk [xn − xk]ε
# 1
ε
for ε 6= 0 (8)
=
n−1Y
k=1
[xn − xk]wk for ε = 0 (9)
for x ∈ D.
Proof. From Theorem 5.5 of Fishburn (1970) continuity, monotonicity, in-
dependence and n > 3 imply that there are monotonic functions f0, f1,...,
fn−1: R2 → R such that
T (x) = f−10
Ã
n−1X
k=1
fk(xk, xn), xn
!
where f−10 is the inverse with respect to the Þrst argument. Using translation
invariance (5) and setting α = −xn we get
T (x) = T (x1 − xn, ..., xn−1 − xn, 0)
or
T (x) = f−10
Ã
n−1X
k=1
fk(xk − xn, 0), 0
!
= g0
Ã
n−1X
k=1
gk(xk − xn)
!
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where g0 (x) := f
−1
0 (x, 0) and gk (x) := fk (x, 0) for k = 1, ..., n − 1. By
monotonicity there exist strictly increasing h0,h1,..., hn−1 such that h1,...,
hn−1 are deÞned on R++ and
T (x) = h0
Ã
n−1X
k=1
hk(xn − xk)
!
Now impose linear homogeneity (4). It is equivalent to
1
λ
h0
Ã
n−1X
k=1
hk(λ [xn − xk])
!
= h0(
n−1X
k=1
hk(xn − xk)) (10)
DeÞne
Hλ0 (x) :=
1
λ
h0(x)
Hλk (x) := hk(λx), for k = 1, ..., n− 1.
Then (10) becomes
Hλ0
Ã
n−1X
k=1
Hλk (xn − xk)
!
= h0(
n−1X
k=1
hk(xn − xk))
Theorem 2, Acze´l (1966), p. 290 implies that
Hλk (x) = ak(λ)hk(x) + bk(λ)
for k = 1, ..., n− 1 and similarly for Hλ0 (x).
Using Theorem 2.7.3 in Eichhorn (1978) yields that there are βk 6= 0,
εk 6= 0 and γk ∈ R such that
hk(x) = βk ln x+ γk
ak(λ) = 1
bk(λ) = γk lnλ
 . (11)
or
hk(x) = βkx
εk + γk
ak(λ) = λ
εk
bk(λ) = γk [1− λεk ]
 . (12)
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Thus there exist β0 and w1, ..., wn−1 such that
T (x) =

β0
£Pn−1
k=1 wk [xn − xk]ε
¤ 1
ε for ε 6= 0
β0
Qn−1
k=1 [xn − xk]wk for ε = 0
(13)
where β0 > 0,
Pn−1
k=1 wk = 1, wk > 0. (We obtain ε1 = ε2 = ... = εn−1 = ε
and ε0 = 1/ε because of linear homogeneity.
P
wk = 1 can be derived by
choosing β0 appropriately.)
Normalization implies that β0 = 1.
It is immediate from (8, 9) that each member of the class Tε is diﬀeren-
tiable. Furthermore we have the following result:
Proposition 2 Assume that D = Ωn; then, for all ε, Tε satisÞes the princi-
ple of transfers from the richest.
Proof. Consider Tε(xin(δ)) for some i such that xi < xn. Given the dif-
ferentiability of (8, 9) the eﬀect of a transfer from the richest can be found
from:
∂Tε (xin(δ))
∂δ
¯¯¯¯
δ=0
= −Tε(x)1−ε
"
n−1X
k=1
wk [xn − xk]ε−1 + wi [xn − xi]ε−1
#
Clearly this is negative, as required by Axiom 7.
However satisfaction of the principle of progressive transfers requires a
further restriction on the class of indices:
Proposition 3 Tε satisÞes the principle of progressive transfers if and only
if
 wk+1 ≤ wk and ε > 1 or
 wk+1 < wk and ε = 1
Proof. Consider a progressive transfer from j to i where xi < xj < xn.
Following Theorem A.4 of Marshall and Olkin (1979) chapter 3, page 57,
Axiom 8 requires
∂Tε(x)
∂xj
<
∂Tε(x)
∂xi
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in other words
−Tε(x)1−εwj [xn − xj]ε−1 < −Tε(x)1−εwi [xn − xi]ε−1
or
wi
wj
<
·
xn − xj
xn − xi
¸ε−1
(14)
If ε > 1 then (14) implies wi ≤ wj. If ε = 1 then (14) implies wi < wj. If
ε < 1 then there is a contradiction.
Proposition 4 Assume that D = Ωn; then, if ε ≤ 0, xn−1 → xn implies that
Tε(x) tends to zero.
Proof. ε = 0: obvious.
ε < 0: Note that Tε(x) is bounded because
0 ≤ Tε(x) ≤ xn − x1.
If xn−1 → xn then xn − xn−1 → 0; so a limit A of Tε(x) exists. Suppose
A > 0. Then this would imply
n−1X
k=1
wk [xn − xk]ε → Aε,
a Þnite limit. But this implies a contradiction because [xn − xn−1]ε →∞.
This is a remarkable property which some may Þnd unattractive. However
it follows naturally from a value judgment implicit in the choice of ε  see
section 5.2.
4.2 Extension to Ω∗n
Now consider the general space of income distributions  let D = Ω∗n in (1).
Then we obtain the following analogue to Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 (1*) Assume that D = Ω∗n; then T satisÞes Axioms 1 to 6
if and only if there are wk > 0, k = 1, ..., n− 1,
Pn−1
k=1 wk = 1 and ε > 0 such
that (8) holds for x ∈ D.
In this case we have the convenient property that Tε(x) = 0 if and only
if all incomes are equal. Analogous counterparts to Propositions 2 and 3 can
also easily be written down for the case D = Ω∗n.
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5 Inequality: discussion
5.1 Aggregation of complaints
We have allowed the aggregation methodology to emerge from the axiomatic
structure rather than imposing it directly. A comparison of (8) with the
argument in Temkin (1986), pages 111-113 shows that the Tε-class satisÞes
the weighted additive principle and, for ε 6= 1, the additive principle as a
special case.
5.2 The inequality index
It is clear that (8, 9) represents an absolute inequality index as conventionally
understood in the literature. The parameter ε is an indicator of sensitivity
of this index and there are some important special cases contained in the
Tε-class (8, 9).
 If ε→∞ the inequality measure becomes the range, xn− x1; this is of
course just the complaint of the poorest person, or max-min inequality
(Cf Temkin 1986, page 109).
 Likewise, if ε→ −∞ the inequality measure becomes an upper-middle
class complaint  the complaint of person n− 1.
 For any ε ≤ 0 the sensitivity to inequality takes a very special form,
that may be defensible, but is not commonly considered in the main-
stream literature  absolute priority is placed on the salience of the
topmost person. As we have seen this absolute priority implies that
once the gap between the richest and the next richest is closed the dis-
tribution is considered to have zero inequality (see the zero-inequality
Y-shaped contours in Figure 2 below).
 The case ε = 1 yields a generalised (absolute) Gini  see Þgure 1.
However, there is no admissible system of weights wk that will yield
the absolute Gini itself.5
5As noted by Temkin (1993, page 133) the ATBO notion of complaint will lead to the
absolute Gini. See also Yitzhaki (1979).
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Figure 1: Typical complaint-inequality contours, ε > 0.
Figure 2: Typical complaint-inequality contours, ε ≤ 0.
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The inequality-contours for four values of ε and for two cases of the
weights are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. These represent the standard view
of the 3-person income distribution map within the simplex for a given value
of mean income µ (see for example Blackorby and Donaldson 1978). Note
that all the measures are well-deÞned for negative incomes; so, although we
have restricted the representation of each contour map to the case of positive
incomes (the boundary and the interior of the triangle), the contours extend
beyond the boundary of the triangle. Given axiom 5 one can generate the
corresponding contours for other values of µ just by resizing the equilateral
triangle.
Note that the speciÞcation of the inequality measure focuses on the repre-
sentative income of the reference group rather than the reference group itself
 in this case the income xn. This is important where there are multiple
persons with the income of the richest in order to ensure continuity of the
inequality index.
5.3 The sequence
Temkin introduces what he calls the sequence (Temkin 1986 page 106) 
in eﬀect a migration story that can be interpreted either as inequality and
immiserisation or inequality and income growth. Consider two Þxed income
levels, x1 and xn (> x1), with m persons on the lower level x1 and n − m
persons on the upper level xn; m is variable between 1 and n − 1 inclusive.
What happens to Tε as m changes?
To borrow Temkins phrase world m can be characterised as an income
vector xm where the components satisfy xn = ... = xm+1 > xm = ... = x1.
Then for ε > 0 (8) yields:
Tε (x
m) =
"
mX
k=1
wk [xn − xk]ε
# 1
ε
=
hXm
k=1
wk
i 1
ε
[xn − x1]
Given that wk > 0 it is clear that Tε (x
m) is increasing in m if ε > 0 (the
worse-and-worse case of Temkin 1986). For the case ε ≤ 0 there is a
degenerate sequence in the same direction: inequality is zero for allm < n−1
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and positive for m = n− 1.6
However, following Temkin, we have only considered the sequence over
unequal worlds  from m = 1 to n − 1. What happens at the ends of
the sequence corresponding to m = 0 and m = n? Clearly inequality is
zero in each of these two extremes and because the inequality measure Tε is
monotonic over the sequence it is always true that there will be a discontinuity
between n− 1 and n.
6 Complaint ordering
Apart from the behaviour of a typical complaint-inequality index it is natural
to consider how the concept of complaint may be used more generally in
ranking income distributions. To this end introduce:
DeÞnition 4 For any x ∈ D deÞne the cumulation of complaints
d0(x) := 0
di(x) := di−1(x) + xn − xi for i = 1, 2, ..., n
¾
(15)
This concept can be used to draw the cumulative complaint contour
(CCC) of a distribution x, formed by joining the points
¡
i
n
, di(x)
¢
; the CCC
must be increasing and concave.7 Intuitively we can see that if CCC(x) lies
on or above CCC(y) then distribution x exhibits more complaint inequality
than distribution y. More formally we can characterise an inequality ordering
<T in terms of the complaint cumulations:
DeÞnition 5 For any x,y ∈ D distribution x exhibits more complaint-
inequality than y (x <T y) if and only if
di(x) ≥ di(y) for i = 1, 2, ..., n
where di is given by (15).
The ordering<T is related to familiar concepts in the welfare economics of
income distribution, in particular the standard generalised-Lorenz ordering
<GL (Shorrocks 1983).
6For further discussion of the sequence and inequality see Amiel and Cowell (1994,
1999 pp. 78-86).
7This is analogous to the TIP curves of Jenkins and Lambert (1997).
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Lemma 6 For any x,y ∈ D: x <T y⇐⇒ [y−yn1] <GL [x−xn1] .
Proof. By deÞnition 5 we have
x <T y⇐⇒
iX
k=1
[xn − xk] ≥
iX
k=1
[yn − yk] , i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
This is equivalent to
1
n
iX
k=1
[yk − yn] ≥ 1
n
iX
k=1
[xk − xn] , i = 1, 2, ..., n (16)
which means that [y−yn1] <GL [x−xn1] .
Now consider a general class of complaint-inequality indices  those that
satisfy the conditions of proposition 3. Let T := T0 ∪ T1 where
T0 :=
(
Tε : ε > 1,
n−1X
k=1
wk = 1, wk ≥ wk+1 > 0
)
T1 :=
(
T1 :
n−1X
k=1
wk = 1, wk > wk+1 > 0
)
There is a close relationship between the class T and the ordering <T .
Proposition 7 For any x,y ∈ D: x <T y ⇐⇒ Tε(x) ≥ Tε(y), for all
Tε ∈ T .
Proof. Consider −Tε(·) as a function of x−xn1: it is clearly symmetric,
nondecreasing and concave in x−xn1. So, using Lemma 6 and Theorem 2 of
Shorrocks (1983), we Þnd that x <T y implies
−Tε(y) ≥ −Tε(x).
Now consider a subfamily of indices with typical member Tα,i ∈ T where
Tα,i(x) :=
n−1X
k=1
wk [xn − xk] (17)
16
wk =

1
i
h
1− 2αk
[n−1][i+1]
i
for k = 1, ..., i
2α[n−k]
[n−1][n−i][n−i−1] for k = i+ 1, ..., n− 1.
 (18)
Each Tα,i is an instance of the case ε = 1 in (8). By assumption
Tα,i(x) ≥ Tα,i(y), i = 1, ..., n− 1. (19)
However from (17) and (18) we have
lim
α→0
Tα,i(x) = di(x)
and so, letting α→ 0, (19) implies
di(x) ≥ di(y), i = 1, ..., n− 1. (20)
Hence x <T y.
7 Extensions
7.1 Welfare
As we noted in section 2.3 complaint-inequality was intended to be viewed
in terms of better or worse, not just less or more. The analysis
in section 4 has focused on the meaning of more or less inequality in
terms of complaints but has not considered the explicit welfare issue. A
simple way to incorporate the complaint-inequality index within a standard
welfare-economic framework would be to write social welfare as
W (x) = Φ(X, T ) (21)
where
X = X(x) =
nX
i=1
xi
T = Tε(x)
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Figure 3: Welfare contours in the case n = 2
are aggregate income and aggregate complaint, respectively, and Φ is nonde-
creasing in its Þrst argument, nonincreasing in its second argument. Some
insight can be obtained by taking the linear case of (21):
W = X − ϕT
where ϕ > 0 is the marginal value of complaint-inequality, corresponding to
−∂Φ
∂T
/ ∂Φ
∂X
in (21). In a two-person world we would have
W = x1 + x2 − ϕ [x2 − x1] (22)
dx2
dx1
¯¯¯¯
dW=0
=
1 + ϕ
1− ϕ (23)
for ϕ 6= 1. The three principal subcases of this are illustrated in Figure
3. Note that the case ϕ = 1 yields max-min contours8 and that ϕ > 1 (23)
corresponds to Meades superegalitarianism (Meade 1976). The case n ≥ 3
can be handled similarly.
Temkin (1993), chapter 6 suggests that inequality matters more in a
poor society than in a rich one. This can be interpreted using the welfare
framework as the case where −∂Φ
∂T
/ ∂Φ
∂X
falls with proportionate increases in
X and T .
8However this only applies for n = 2. In general BOP is distinct from Rawls (1971)
Maximum Principle  see Temkin (1993), pages 105 ﬀ.
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7.2 ATBO and AVE
We have focused on one speciÞc interpretation of the reference group and
reference income used to deÞne a complaint. However, the insight from
Proposition 1 can be extended to include other concepts.
For a Þrst example deÞne the conditional mean
µk(x) :=
1
n− k
nX
h=k+1
xh
and consider the following family of indices
T ∗ε (x) =

£Pn−1
k=1 wk [µk(x)− xk]ε
¤ 1
ε for ε 6= 0,Qn−1
k=1 [µk(x)− xk]wk for ε = 0.
(24)
This is clearly the ATBO counterpart of the family (8, 9) and is essentially
the same as the deprivation index suggested by Chakravarty and Mukherjee
(1999), page 95.
As a second example take the conventional overall mean µ(x) and consider
the family
T ∗∗ε (x) =
 [
Pn
k=1wk |µ(x)− xk|ε]
1
ε for ε 6= 0,Qn
k=1 |µ(x)− xk|wk for ε = 0.
(25)
This is an AVE counterpart of the family (8, 9), related to the family of
compromise inequality measures discussed by Ebert (1988).9
7.3 Implementation
Because the nature of BOP is to focus attention on the richest individual this
approach to inequality measurement could attract criticism as to its practi-
cality in empirical application. For some values of ε there will be a problem
of hypersensitivity to small changes in the topmost income and this might
9However, some caution is necessary here because it is unclear how Temkin intended to
treat complaints in the case of AVE where incomes are greater than the mean (Devooght
2001).
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mean that inequality estimates could be unreliable when confronted with ac-
tual data. There also appears to be a problem of informational requirements
in translating the idea of BOP complaints to the real-world: in which com-
munities is it clearly known who the richest person is or what his/her income
actually is?
However, these issues are familiar from discussions relating to the imple-
mentation of Rawls (1971) Diﬀerence Principle and indeed there are prac-
tical work-rounds  see Temkin (1993), pages 111 ﬀ. It is clear that the
analysis of section 4 would carry over to the case where n individuals were
replaced by ν equal-sized income-ordered groups and inequality within each
group were deemed to be irrelevant. For BOP the key concept then becomes
the representative income for the topmost group. An appropriate suggestion
would be to use the corresponding quantile as the representative income for
each group; the case ε → ∞ would then be approximated by the diﬀerence
between extreme quantiles.10
8 Conclusion
Although Temkin produced some remarkably original insights into the mean-
ing of economic inequality his work left a gap regarding the type of inequality
indices that would capture his concept of complaint. We have Þlled that gap
using an axiom system that corresponds to the types of assumption made
elsewhere in the literature on the assessment of income distributions. The
result is a new class of inequality indices that bears a distinctive relationship
to known families of inequality and poverty indices. Associated with that
class we also have a new type of ranking principle that neatly embodies the
comparison of income distributions in terms of complaints.
10Cf the recommendation in Atkinson et al. (2002) pp 126-127. For any q, 0 < q < 1
the qth quantile is an income x(q) := minxi :
i
n ≥ q.
20
References
Acze´l, J. (1966). Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications,
Mathematics in Science and Engineering. Number 9. New York: Aca-
demic Press.
Amiel, Y. and F. A. Cowell (1994). Inequality changes and income growth.
In W. Eichhorn (Ed.), Models and measurement of welfare and inequal-
ity, pp. 326. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Amiel, Y. and F. A. Cowell (1998). Distributional orderings and the trans-
fer principle: a re-examination. Research on Economic Inequality 8,
195215.
Amiel, Y. and F. A. Cowell (1999). Thinking about Inequality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Atkinson, A. B. (1970). On the measurement of inequality. Journal of
Economic Theory 2, 244263.
Atkinson, A. B., B. Cantillon, E. Marlier, and B. Nolan (2002). Social
Indicators: The EU and Social Inclusion. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Blackorby, C. and D. Donaldson (1978). Measures of relative equality and
their meaning in terms of social welfare. Journal of Economic The-
ory 18, 5980.
Chakravarty, S. R. (1998). Relative deprivation and satisfaction orderings.
Keio Economic Studies 34, 1731.
Chakravarty, S. R. and D. Mukherjee (1999). Measures of deprivation and
their meaning in terms of social satisfaction. Theory and Decision 47,
89100.
Cowell, F. A. (2000). Measurement of inequality. In A. B. Atkinson and
F. Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Chapter 2.
Amsterdam: North Holland.
Dalton, H. (1920). Measurement of the inequality of incomes. Economic
Journal 30 (9), 348361.
Devooght, K. (2001). Measuring inequality by counting complaints:
theory and empirics. Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper 57,
STICERD, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE.
21
Ebert, U. (1988). A family of aggregative compromise inequality measure.
International Economic Review 29 (5), 363376.
Ebert, U. and P. Moyes (2000). An axiomatic characterization of Yitzhakis
index of individual deprivation. Economics Letters 68 (3), 263270.
Ebert, U. and P. Moyes (2002). A simple axiomatization of the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke poverty orderings. Journal of Public Economic The-
ory forthcoming.
Eichhorn, W. (1978). Functional Equations in Economics. Reading Mas-
sachusetts: Addison Wesley.
Fishburn, P. C. (1970). Utility theory for decision making. New York: John
Wiley.
Foster, J. E., J. Greer, and E. Thorbecke (1984). A class of decomposable
poverty measures. Econometrica 52, 761776.
Jenkins, S. P. and P. J. Lambert (1997). Three Is of poverty curves,
with an analysis of UK poverty trends. Oxford Economic Papers 49,
317327.
Marshall, A. W. and I. Olkin (1979). Inequalities: Theory and Majoriza-
tion. New York: Academic Press.
Meade, J. E. (1976). The Just Economy, Chapter VII: Measurement and
patterns of inequality. Allen and Unwin.
Pigou, A. C. (1912). Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
Runciman, W. G. (1966). Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. London:
Routledge.
Shorrocks, A. F. (1983). Ranking income distributions. Economica 50, 3
17.
Temkin, L. S. (1986). Inequality. Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs 15, 99121.
Temkin, L. S. (1993). Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yitzhaki, S. (1979). Relative deprivation and the Gini coeﬃcient.Quarterly
Journal of Economics 93, 321324.
22
